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Introduction 
In order to have a successful radioactive waste management 
and d isposal program, the federal government must build 
public confidence and trust in the siting process (1 ). To do 
this three requirements must be met: 1) the program must be 
technically feasible; 2) the program must be politically palat-
able; and 3) the program must be societally acceptable. 
Citizen participation is necessaty to ensure that a radioac-
tive waste management program is accepted by society and is 
politically feasible. Citizen involvement indirectly impacts 
technical feasibility by addressing the ethical and moral 
implications of nuclear waste disposal, thus helping to estab-
lish the parameters of technical solutions. 
Societal Acceptance of the Federal High-Level 
Waste Program 
When disposing of radioact ive waste, it is inherent that 
value judgements will be made. This is most clearly illustrated 
by the technical guidelines that are part of the waste manage-
ment program. Words such as "safe" and "acceptable" and 
"reasonably achievable" are relative terms. To whom is a risk 
"acceptable" - the Department of Energy (DOE), the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the general public? 
How safe is "safe" and who makes that value judgement' 
A case in point is the "Environmental Radiation Protection 
Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear 
Fuel, High Level, and Transuranic Wastes" developed by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These standards 
set radiation release limits that the DOE must meet in design-
ing a repository. The NRC is to ensure that the repository 
design meets these standards when issuing a license to DOE 
for construction of the repository. 
The EPA standards allow for radiation releases into the 
environment at a level that would cause 1,000 fatal cancers 
over a 10,000 year period ; that is, one fatal cancer evety 10 
years from the reposit01y. (The standard does not address 
how many non- fatal cancers would occur because of radiation 
releases from the repository.) 
Is this an acceptable level of risk? Clearly, it is to the EPA or 
they would have set a different standard. Yet, citizen testimony 
on the DOE's Draft Area Recommendation Report (DARR) 
shows that this is clearly an unacceptable level of risk to the 
public. One woman at the Warren, Minn. , hearing asked 
whose child will die of leukemia because of this standard? 
This is an emotional question. But emotions are an approp-
riate response in addressing value judgement issues. 
Volume 52 , Number 1, 19R6/ 87 
The disposal of radioactive waste raises a number of ethical 
and moral questions which will have to be addressed before 
society accepts a waste disposal program. Two of these issues 
are the intergenerational transfer of the risks inherent in 
nuclear waste disposal, and the continued production of 
nuclear wastes when we have no safe and proven technology 
for isolating these wastes for thousands of years. 
In 1944, very little high-level nuclear waste needed dispo-
sal. By 1980, there were 10 million cubic feet of liquid high-
level waste from nuclear weapons production in temporary 
storage and 122,000 cubic feet of irradiated (spent) reactor 
fuel awaiting disposal (2). In the interim, society allegedly 
benefited from the production of these wastes yet we are 
passing on the risk of contamination of food and water resour-
ces to future generations. We are passing on the risks of cancer 
and birth defects to 500 generations over 10,000 years. 
Is this morally responsible? Is it ethically acceptable' 
Should we, as a society, continue to produce these wastes 
when we cannot guarantee future generations will not be 
harmed by them? What are the consequences of stopping or 
phasing out the production of high-level waste? Which conse-
quences are acceptable and which are not? How do we bal-
ance present societal needs against the needs of future gener-
ations? What are our land and water stewardship responsibil -
ities to future generations? 
These are fundamental questions which must be addressed 
before a waste management program can be successful. The 
questions raised deal with abstract concepts (such as land and 
water stewardship) yet the waste disposal program provides a 
context for consideration of these concepts; it quite literally 
brings the issues "down to earth ," since DOE wants to bury 
this waste in the ground. How these questions will ultimately 
be answered depends on societal value judgements. And 
these value judgements are discussed and articulated by citi-
zen involvement in the waste management program. If the 
concerns raised by citizens at the DOE hearings are ignored by 
the agency or by Congress, the result will be the failure to site a 
repository. 
The Political Feasibility of Siting a High-Level 
Waste Repository. 
The siting of a high level nuclear waste facility is as much a 
political decision as a technical one. The federal government 
has an unbroken track record of40years of failure in attempt-
ing to successfully manage the nation 's high-level waste. Lack 
of federal competence and poor responsiveness to the needs 
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of states and citizens has lead to a distrust of the federal 
government's ability to safely dispose of nuclear waste (3). 
However naive ly, people in the 1950s and early 1960s 
trusted the federal government to protect them from radioac-
tive fall out from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons 
and fro m radiation releases from nuclear reactors. That public 
trust has been replaced by a healthy skepticism of the federal 
government's commitment to protect the public's health and 
safety. 
The DOE is charged with both the promotion of nuclear 
power and the disposal of nuclear wastes, thus creating a 
conflict of responsibilities ( 1 ). Moreover, DOE, as the federal 
agency responsible for nuclear weapons production and for 
the storage of high level military waste , has a vested interest in 
siting a nuclear waste facility based on political expediency 
rather than sound technical criteria. Further, DOE has an 
abysmal track record in handling the military waste under its 
care in an environmentally sound manner. At the Hanford 
reservation in Washington state, more than 500,000 gallons of 
high-level liquid waste have leaked from underground tanks 
over a period of years (2) . The DOE waste storage program is 
not licensed by the NRC nor subject to any public oversight. 
DOE remains accountable to no one for its actions of 
mismanagement. 
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which established the current 
waste management program and named DOE as the agency 
responsible for siting and constructing two underground rep-
ositories, is a product of political compromises. The rigid 
timetables for siting and construction of two repositories were 
established to give assurances to the commercial nuclear 
power industry that the federal government was indeed 
serious about "solving" the waste disposal problem. Many 
people believe that the economic viability of the nuclear 
power industry is linked to DOE's ability to state that it has 
"solved" the waste disposal problem. The DOE has been 
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criticized for foll owing the timetable at the expense of techni-
cal excellence in the site selection process. 
Given the political nature of the radioactive waste man-
agement program, citizen participation in the DOE siting 
process is essential to ensure that DOE does, in fact, isolate 
this waste in an envi ronmentally sound manner. Or if the 
technology does not currently exist, to ensure that the waste is 
stored temporarily in an envi ronmentally sound manner until 
the technology for safe disposal is developed. 
Finally, citizen participation in government decision mak-
ing is a fundamental democratic principle. The political his-
tory of radioactive waste management, and the complex value 
judgements involved in establishing a waste disposal program 
make the need for citizen participation all the more important. 
Conclusion 
Athough actively involving non-technical people in the 
nuclear waste siting program may be cumbersome and time-
consuming, it is necessary for the successful isolation of 
nuclear waste. To ignore citi zen concerns and value judge-
ments is to doom any radioactive waste management program 
-no matter how technically sound - to failure. 
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